

November 12, 2025,¹ Corley emailed a press release from the email address corleyforcongress@gmail.com with the subject line, “Jason Corley Announces Exploratory Committee for Texas’ 19th Congressional District.” The body of the November 12 email read:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

November 12, 2025

Jason Corley Announces Exploratory Committee for Texas’ 19th Congressional District

Lubbock, TX – Following Congressman Jodey Arrington’s announcement that he will not seek a sixth term, Lubbock County Commissioner Jason Corley has received an outpouring of encouragement from supporters across West Texas and the Big Country urging him to run for Congress.

“I was surprised and humbled by the number of calls and messages from friends, supporters, and members of the media encouraging me to run,” Corley said. “After much consideration, I’ve decided to form an exploratory committee to assess the level of public support for a campaign to represent the people of West Texas and the Big Country in Congress.”

Further details about the exploratory committee and next steps will be announced soon.

Stop voting for men in suits. Vote for the man in the Steel Toed Boots!

Jason Corley
Media Contact:
Landon Wood
Corleyforcongress@gmail.com
806-292-7529

Below the press release was the following:

Corley for Congress
P.O. Box 72
Slaton, TX 79364
CorleyforCongress@gmail.com

Stop voting for men in suits. Vote for the man in the Steel Toed Boots!

The email included a Corley for Congress graphic.

6. **The text message.** On November 14, 2025,² Corley sent a text message to a prominent member of the Lubbock community (who formerly served in congress and other important positions) that read, in part, “my name is Jason Corley. I am the County Commissioner for Lubbock County precinct 2. I’m running for congress in congressional district 19. I had a couple of questions for you if you’ve got the time”

¹ One year, one month, and nineteen days before the end of his current term.

² One year, one month, and seventeen days before the end of his current term.

7. **The campaign announcement and ballot application.** On December 2, 2025,³ Corley publicly announced his candidacy at a press-conference. On December 3, 2025,⁴ Corley applied for a place on the general primary ballot for the 19th Congressional District of Texas. This announcement and application for a place on the ballot does not trigger the Resign to Run Rule because they occurred less than one year and one month before the end of Corley’s current term of office.⁵

8. **The attempted ouster and justification.** On December 8, 2025, the County Judge Curtis Parrish attempted to oust Corley from office based solely on the November 12, 2025, press release announcing an exploratory committee and the November 14, 2025, text message. Judge Parrish delivered Corley the letter attached to Plaintiff’s Original Petition as Exhibit C. Judge Parrish included in his analysis why Corley was a “candidate” as that term is defined in Texas Election Code section 251.001(1) by November 14, 2025, and he concluded:

Based on the above statements made by Jason Corley prior to one year and 30 days before the expiration of his term of office, I, Lubbock County Judge Curtis Parrish, by the authority granted to me by the Constitution and Laws of the State of Texas, do hereby announce that the office of Lubbock County Commissioner Precinct 2 is VACANT by the automatic resignation of Jason Corley under the provisions of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Election Code.

On December 8, 2025, armed sheriff deputies escorted Corley to his office to pack his personal belongings. They then then escorted Corley out of the commissioner’s court suite.

D. Analysis

9. **Introduction.** The Texas Constitution provides that a county commissioner elected by the qualified voters of his or her precinct is entitled to hold office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified.⁶ The Texas Constitution further provides that “all officers of this State shall continue to perform the duties of their offices until their successors shall be duly qualified.”⁷

10. **The Resign to Run Rule.** It is possible for a commissioner to resign before the expiration of their term, including by automatic resignation under the Resign to Run Rule. Texas Constitution, Art. XVI, § 65(b) establishes two grounds for automatic resignation when an elected official seeks another office with more than one year and thirty days remaining in their current term of office: “(1) announcing candidacy, and (2) in fact becoming a candidate”⁸ (Before 2011, the Resign to

³ One year and twenty-nine days before the end of his current term.

⁴ One year and twenty-eight days before the end of his current term.

⁵ Tex. Const., Art. XVI, § 65(b).

⁶ Tex. Const., Art. V, § 18(b).

⁷ Tex. Const., Art. XVI, § 17(a).

⁸ *Standley v. Sansom*, 367 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012); Tex. Const., Art. XVI, § 65 (a county commissioner who announces their candidacy, or who “in fact become[s] a candidate, in any General, Special or Primary Election, for any office of profit or trust under the laws of this State or the United States other than the office then held, at any time when the unexpired term of the office then held shall exceed one year and 30 days, such announcement or such candidacy shall constitute an automatic resignation of

Run Rule applied if an elected official had more than one year remaining in their current term.⁹⁾ The Resign to Run Rule results in an automatic resignation of an elected official's current office if, with more than one year and thirty days in their current term they:

a. Announce their candidacy for another office.¹⁰ An elected official announces their candidacy for another office within the meaning of the Resign to Run Rule by making a public statement "if a reasonable person may conclude from the statement that the individual intends, without qualification, to run for the office in question."¹¹

b. Become a candidate in fact for another office.¹² An elected official "in fact become[s] a candidate" for another office within the meaning of the Resign to Run Rule "by the act of applying for a place on the ballot."¹³

D.1 – First issue: The definition of "candidate" in Election Code § 251.001(1) is not applicable in this case

11. **The language of the statute.** Section 251.001 reads "In this title," *i.e.*, Title 15 of the Election Code, "Candidate' means" ¹⁴ The plain language of section 251.001 makes clear that the definitions therein apply only to Election Code Title 15, not the Texas Constitution. The meaning of the terms in the Resign to Run Rule are not found in the Election Code.

12. **Constitutional interpretation.** Section 251.001 does not purport to modify or expand the Resign to Run Rule, nor could it. The Texas Constitution can only be modified by amendment; the meaning of its terms cannot be changed by statute. "The provisions of the Texas Constitution mean what they meant when they were promulgated and adopted, 'and it does not lie within the power of the Legislature to change their meaning, or to enact laws in conflict therewith.'" ¹⁵ The Texas Supreme Court wrote, "It is the settled law of this State that the provisions of our State Constitution mean what they meant when they were promulgated and adopted, and their meaning is not different at any subsequent time. Constitutional provisions must be construed in the light of conditions existing at the time of adoption, and it does not lie within the power of the Legislature to change their meaning, or to enact laws in conflict therewith."¹⁶ The terms of the Resign to Run Rule mean what they meant when adopted by the voters in 1958 and are in no way

the office then held, and the vacancy thereby created shall be filled pursuant to law in the same manner as other vacancies for such office are filled.")

⁹ 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Sen. Jt. Res. 37 (substituting "one year and 30 days" for "one (1) year"; adopted at the November 8, 2011, election).

¹⁰ Tex. Const., Art. XVI, § 65(b).

¹¹ Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0249 (2000) (discussing qualified vs. unqualified statements of intention); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-0210, at 1 (2004) (concluding a statement made in private to a reporter was not necessarily "public enough" to constitute an announcement as a matter of law).

¹² Tex. Const., Art. XVI, § 65(b).

¹³ Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0249, at 3 (2000).

¹⁴ Tex. Elect. Code § 251.001.

¹⁵ *Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.*, 268 S.W.3d 190, 202 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008) (citing *Jones v. Ross*, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (Tex. 1943)).

¹⁶ *Jones v. Ross*, 173 S.W.2d 1022, 1024 (Tex. 1943).

modified by the definition of candidate in Title 15 of the Election Code.¹⁷ The Texas OAG has reached the same conclusion: “we do not believe that [Texas Election Code § 251.001] controls the meaning of “candidate” for purposes of [Texas Constitution Art. XVI, § 65].”¹⁸ Clearly one cannot take the definition of candidate from Section 251.001 of the Elections Code and try to apply it to Texas Constitution Art. XVI, § 65. The question is: what did the words of Texas Constitution Art. XVI, § 65 mean when they were adopted by the voter in 1958? This question is addressed in paragraph 15, below.

13. Candidates for federal office are not covered by Title 15 of the Election Code. Furthermore, in the case of a candidate for federal office, Title 15 of the Texas Election Code does not apply.¹⁹ The law provides, “Except as provided by Subsection (b), this title does not apply to a candidate for an office of the federal government.”²⁰ Section 251.001 is in in title 15 of the Election Code, and Election Code Title 15, including section 251.001(1), is not applicable because the candidacy in question is for US Congress.²¹

14. Conclusion. The definition of candidate in the Election Code Section 251.001 does not apply to this situation because of the plain language of the statue limiting that definition to Title 15 of the Election Code, a statute cannot modify a constitutional provision, and the candidate in question seeks federal office.

D.2 – Second issue: Corley did not make an announcement of his candidacy or become a candidate for Texas District 19 before December 2, 2025

15. Announce (v.). In 1958, at the time of the adoption of Texas Constitution Art. XVI, § 65, the word “announce” meant:

- a. **Webster’s New Practical:** “to give *public* notice of; to proclaim.”²²
- b. **The American College Dictionary:** “to make known *publicly*; give notice of.”²³

¹⁷ *See id.* (the terms of the constitution mean what they meant when adopted and the legislature has no power to change their meaning).

¹⁸ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. JC-0249, at 5 (2000) (Addressing whether the legislature’s attempt to define “candidate” in the Election Code was unconstitutional in the context of the resign to run rule: “Section 251.001 defines the term ‘candidate’ for purposes of title 15 of the Election Code, which governs campaign contributions and expenditures, reporting requirements, and campaign advertising. It is within the legislature’s prerogative to define the term ‘candidate’ broadly for these purposes. While some of the affirmative actions listed in section 251.001 may be very relevant to whether a person has announced a candidacy for office or become a candidate in fact within the meaning of Article XVI, section 65, there is no indication in the statute that the legislature intended the section 251.001(1)(H) definition of ‘candidate’ to define the term for purposes of article XVI, section 65. Thus, we do not believe that the statutory provision controls the meaning of candidate for purposes of the constitutional provision.”)

¹⁹ Tex. Elec. Code § 251.006(a).

²⁰ Tex. Elec. Code § 251.006(a).

²¹ Tex. Elec. Code § 251.001(1).

²² Webster’s New Practical Dictionary (1957), “announce” (v.).

²³ The American College Dictionary (1958), “announce” (v.) (emphasis supplied).

- c. **Webster’s New Standard Dictionary:** “to give first *public* notice of.”²⁴

The meaning of the word has not changed much. Updated definitions of announce include:

- a. **Oxford English Dictionary:** “to make (something) known by *public* or official statement; to proclaim or authoritatively deliver (a piece of news or information).”²⁵
- b. **Merriam-Webster:** “to make known *publicly*; proclaim.”²⁶
- c. **Black’s Law Dictionary:** “to make *publicly* known; to proclaim formally.”²⁷
- d. **American Heritage Dictionary:** “to make known *publicly*.”²⁸

Every definition of announce involves a *public* dissemination of information, whether from 1958 or the present. **As the meaning of announce and the precedents make clear, to trigger the Resign to Run Rule, an announcement of candidacy must both (a) be made publicly and (b) be an unqualified statement of an intent to run.** A public statement of potential candidacy—*e.g.*, an announcement of an exploratory committee—will not trigger the Resign to Run Rule, nor will a private statement of a definite candidacy—*e.g.*, private correspondence to a friend of an intent to run.

Announcement of candidacy

16. **Summary of applicable law.** To constitute an announcement of candidacy under the Resign to Run Rule a statement of candidacy must be both (a) definite and unqualified and (b) public.²⁹ The cases in which an elected official “announced” their candidacy for elected office involve public declarations of candidacy, not one-on-one conversations held in private. For example, (a) a press release sent to and printed in a newspaper announcing candidacy,³⁰ (b) a statement made in an open commissioner’s court session announcing candidacy,³¹ and (c) repeated statements made to a dozen others in public spaces and in an on-the-record interview with a newspaper editor³² are announcements of candidacy. In contrast, a private conversation, even with a newspaper reporter, regarding candidacy for another office is not necessarily an announcement of candidacy.³³ In that last case, the Texas OAG rendered an opinion that the conversation with the

²⁴ Webster’s New Standard Dictionary (1958), “announce” (v.) (emphasis supplied).

²⁵ Oxford English Dictionary (2025), “announce” (v.) (emphasis supplied).

²⁶ Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2025), “announce” (v.) (emphasis supplied).

²⁷ Black’s Law Dictionary (2024), “announce” (v.) (emphasis supplied).

²⁸ The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2022), “announce” (v.) (emphasis supplied).

²⁹ See *Standley*, 367 S.W.3d at 346-47; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. WW-1253, at 1 (1962); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-0377, at 1 (1996); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. GA-0210, at 2 (2004) (citing Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. DM-377 (1996), WW-1253 (1962)).

³⁰ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. WW-1253, at 1 (1962).

³¹ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-0377, at 1 (1996).

³² *Standley*, 367 S.W.3d at 346-47.

³³ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. GA-0210, at 1 (2004).

reporter did not constitute an announcement of candidacy because “an announcement must be both certain and *public* to trigger automatic resignation. This is consistent with the common understanding of the word ‘announce’ to mean ‘to make known publicly.’³⁴ Each of these cases are discussed in greater detail below.

17. JP’s 1962 press release announcing candidacy quoted in newspaper is announcement of candidacy. D.J. Lerma was elected to the office of Justice of the Peace of Cameron County for a four-year term, to expire on December 31, 1962.³⁵ On December 11, 1961, with over a year in his current term, he sent a press release to the Brownsville Herald, which was quoted in the newspaper that day as follows: “It is my desire—and I have been urged by my friends—to seek the elective post of County Court at Law Judge,” said Lerma. “With the election set for May 5, only four months away, I find it necessary to announce at this time that I will be a candidate for the position of County Court at Law Judge.”³⁶ The OAG addressed several questions, including whether the justice of the peace “announced his candidacy” within the meaning of the Resign to Run Rule by causing a press release to be printed in the newspaper on December 11, 1961.³⁷ The OAG concluded that he did announce his candidacy “on December 11, 1961, the date the newspaper article in question appeared in the Brownsville Herald. By the operation of [the Resign to Run Rule], such announcement constituted an automatic resignation of the office of Justice of the Peace.”³⁸

18. CCAL judge’s 1995 statement of candidacy in open commissioner’s court session is announcement of candidacy. At the March 27, 1995, meeting of the Hopkins County Commissioners Court, the judge of the county court at law, who had over a year in his present term of office, stated “he was at that moment a candidate” for the Eighth Judicial District Court, resulting in a newspaper article about the candidacy.³⁹ The OAG opinion, citing the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989), recognized that “To announce is to deliver news; to make public or official intimation of, to proclaim. . . .”⁴⁰ The definitive statement made in open commissioner’s court led the OAG to conclude, as a matter of law, that the judge had announced his candidacy or had in fact become a candidate and had automatically resigned.⁴¹

19. Office holder’s 1995 qualified statement of seriously considering campaign not an announcement. In 1995, the OAG was asked to render an opinion about whether a current office holder automatically resigned under the Resign to Run Rule by making the statement, “If the current county judge resigns or decides not to seek re-election, I will seriously consider running for county

³⁴ *Id.*, at 2 (internal citations omitted) (citing Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. DM-377 (1996), WW-1253 (1962)).

³⁵ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. WW-1253, at 1 (1962).

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ *Id.*, at 2.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-0377, at 1 (1996).

⁴⁰ *Id.*, at 2.

⁴¹ *Id.*

judge.”⁴² The OAG reasoned that the “paramount consideration must be the impression one’s statements makes upon his auditors and potential voters. If a reasonable person may conclude after hearing the statement that the individual intends, without qualification, to run for the office in question, we believe that the individual may be said to have ‘announced his or her candidacy.’”⁴³ The OAG concluded that the statement in question was not an announcement of candidacy because the promise to seriously *consider* running for another office may not reasonably be viewed as an announcement of candidacy.⁴⁴ Even more so because the statement was contingent on the sitting county judge’s decision not to run.

20. JP’s 2003 private conversation with reporter resulting in news story regarding candidacy not an announcement as a matter of law. On December 31, 2003, a Bell County justice of the peace, whose term of office was to expire on December 31, 2004, privately told a newspaper reporter of his intention to run for county commissioner in the March 2004 primary.⁴⁵ The next day, January 1, 2004, the newspaper ran a story reporting the justice of the peace’s candidacy for county commissioner.⁴⁶ Since the Resign to Run Rule in 2003 turned on whether there was more than one year in the remaining term when the office holder announced their candidacy or in fact became a candidate, whether the December 31, 2003, conversation constituted an announcement of candidacy was the pivotal issue; any announcement on January 1, 2004, would not trigger the Resign to Run Rule.⁴⁷ The Texas Office of the Attorney General rendered an opinion that the conversation with the reporter that resulted in the newspaper article did not constitute an announcement of candidacy because “an announcement must be both certain and *public* to trigger automatic resignation. This is consistent with the common understanding of the word ‘announce’ to mean ‘to make known publicly.’”⁴⁸ The OAG opinion concludes that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that the private statement to the reporter made one year and one day before the end of the justice of the peace’s term of office did not constitute an announcement of candidacy for county commissioner on that date.⁴⁹

21. Constable told a dozen others, including newspaper editor, in 2007 about his candidacy, including in public places. In late 2007, the Real County constable decided to run for sheriff.⁵⁰ He told a dozen people he was running for sheriff, many times in a public setting in non-confidential conversations.⁵¹ One conversation in particular was an on-the-record conversation with a newspaper editor.⁵² All of these statements were made with more than a

⁴² Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-071.

⁴³ *Id.*, at 2.

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. GA-0210, at 1 (2004).

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ *Id.*, at 2 (internal citations omitted) (citing Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. DM-377 (1996), WW-1253 (1962)).

⁴⁹ *Id.*, at 3.

⁵⁰ *Standley v. Sansom*, 367 S.W.3d 343, 346-47 (Tex App.—San Antonio 2012).

⁵¹ *Id.*, at 347.

⁵² *Id.*

year remaining in his unexpired term.⁵³ The Court of Appeals overruled Standley's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's decision not to provide a specific definition of the term "announcement" in response to a jury note asking for a dictionary so they could look up the definition of announcement.⁵⁴ The *Standley* Court held that announce has no distinct legal meaning and has its ordinary meaning.⁵⁵

22. Corley's exploratory committee announcement. Corley did not announce his candidacy for Texas District 19 on November 12, 2025; he announced that he was creating an exploratory committee to consider it. On November 12, 2025, Corley emailed a press release regarding creation of an exploratory committee to members of the media. This message was undoubtedly public, but was it an unqualified announcement of candidacy? There are no similar cases or OAG opinions, but the OAG has summarized the issue as whether "a reasonable person may conclude from the statement that the individual intends, without qualification, to run for the office in question."⁵⁶ But clearly that is not what the email in question said. Reviewing the communication as a whole, it is apparent:

- a. Corley announced the formation of an exploratory committee for a Texas District 19 campaign "to assess the level of public support for a campaign to represent the people of West Texas and the Big Country in Congress";
- b. Corley referenced "an outpouring of encouragement from supporters across West Texas and the Big Country urging him to run";
- c. Corley promised future details about the exploratory committee and next steps; and
- d. Corley had campaign graphics, email addresses, and a PO Box prepared for a potential campaign.

Conspicuous by its absence is any unqualified statement that Corley intends to run for Congress (e.g., "I'm running for Congress"). Instead, reviewing the communication as a whole, it communicates to any reasonable reader that Corley was forming an exploratory committee to consider running for congress. This announcement of an exploratory committee is clearly distinguishable from the December 11, 1961, press release the Cameron County JP sent to the Brownsville Herald, which that newspaper quoted that day as follows: "It is my desire—and I have been urged by my friends—to seek the elective post of County Court at Law Judge," said Lerma. "With the election set for May 5, only four months away, I find it necessary to announce at this time that I will be a candidate for the position of County Court at Law Judge."⁵⁷ And it is equally distinguishable from the Hopkins county court at law judge's statement in open commissioners court in 1995 stating that "he was at that moment a candidate" for district court judge.⁵⁸ Of all the prior

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Standley*, 367 S.W.3d 343.

⁵⁵ *Id.*, at 351.

⁵⁶ Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-0249, at 2 (2000) (citing Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. LO-95-071)).

⁵⁷ Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. WW-1253, at 1 (1962).

⁵⁸ Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. DM-0377, at 1 (1996).

cases dealing with this issue, Corley’s November 12 announcement of an exploratory committee is most similar to the qualified statement, “If the current county judge resigns or decides not to seek re-election, I will seriously consider running for county judge.”⁵⁹ Neither announcement expressed a present intention to run, but expressed that such a decision was being seriously considered and was possible. A reasonable person cannot conclude from Corley’s November 12 announcement of an exploratory committee, read as a whole, that he intends, without qualification, to run for Congress.

23. Corley’s private text message. Corley’s text message to a retired local politician was a private communication; it does not matter that it clearly expressed an unqualified intent to run for congress because it was private. There was nothing public about it; the text message did not disseminate information to anybody other than the intended recipient. This statement was more like the private, one-on-one conversation the OAG found was not an announcement because “an announcement must be both certain and *public* to trigger automatic resignation. This is consistent with the common understanding of the word ‘announce’ to mean ‘to make known publicly.’⁶⁰ And Corley’s private text message stands in stark contrast to the announcements made in the press release regarding candidacy sent to the newspaper⁶¹ and the statement of candidacy made in open commissioners court.⁶²

Candidate in fact

24. County commissioner’s 1973 application to appear on the ballot results in automatic resignation. In 1973, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that Bexar County Commissioner Ramirez automatically resigned under the Resign to Run Rule when he applied to have his name placed on the school board ballot with three years left in his term.⁶³

25. Judge’s 2000 effort to have political party’s executive committee’s nomination to appear on the general election ballot is not an announcement or becoming a candidate in fact. In 2000, the Collin County Criminal District Attorney sought an OAG opinion about whether a county court at law judge who sought the nomination of his party’s executive committee to appear on the general election ballot for a newly created district court automatically resigned their current office under the Resign to Run Rule.⁶⁴ The OAG concluded that seeking a nomination from a party’s executive committee does not constitute being a candidate in fact because an office holder only “‘in fact becomes a candidate’ by the act of applying for a place on the ballot.”⁶⁵

⁵⁹ Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-95-071.

⁶⁰ *Id.*, at 2 (internal citations omitted) (citing Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. Nos. DM-377 (1996), WW-1253 (1962)).

⁶¹ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. WW-1253, at 1 (1962).

⁶² Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. DM-0377, at 1 (1996).

⁶³ *Ramirez v. Flores*, 505 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973). This could have been analyzed under becoming a candidate provision instead of announcement, but the trial and appellate court treated it under the announcement provision.

⁶⁴ Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. JC-0249 (2000).

⁶⁵ *Id.*, at 3.

26. **Constable's 2007 application to appear on the ballot.** In late 2007, the Real County constable decided to run for sheriff.⁶⁶ Constable Standley applied to appear on the primary ballot and paid the filing fee, delivering the application and fee to the party chairman with more than a year remaining in his unexpired term.⁶⁷ The Court of Appeals overruled Standley's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.⁶⁸

27. **Corley became candidate in fact on December 3, 2025.** Corley did not apply to be on the ballot until December 3, 2025, one year and 28 days before his term ends. Neither the email announcing the exploratory committee nor the private text message made Corley a candidate in fact. This case is nothing like *Ramirez*, where a county commissioner applied to be on the school board ballot with three years remaining in his term.⁶⁹ And it is nothing like the *Standley* case, where the constable applied to appear on the primary ballot and paid the filing fee, delivering them to the party chair, during the applicable period for the Resign to Run Rule.⁷⁰

28. **Conclusion.** Corley did not become a candidate in fact until he applied to appear on the ballot on December 3, 2025, outside of the timeframe for application of the Resign to Run Rule.

Respectfully submitted,
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Certificate of Service

I certify that this document was served on the following on December 11, 2025, in compliance with Rules 21 and 21a.

Mark Meurer

Sent via email

Benjamin P. Garcia
Benjamin P. Garcia

⁶⁶ *Standley v. Sansom*, 367 S.W.3d 343, 346-47 (Tex App.—San Antonio 2012).

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ *Standley*, 367 S.W.3d at 351-54.

⁶⁹ *Ramirez v. Flores*, 505 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973).

⁷⁰ *Standley*, 367 S.W.3d at 47.